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Abstract 
Recent studies have revealed that memory is enhanced when information is processed for fitness-
related purposes. The main objective of the current experiments was to test developmental trends 
in the evolutionary foundation of memory using different types of stimuli and paradigms. In 
Experiment 1, 11-year-olds and adults were presented with neutral, negative, and survival-related 
DRM word lists. We found a memory benefit for the survival-related words and showed that 
false memories were more likely to be elicited for the survival-related word lists than for the 
other lists. Experiment 2 examined developmental trends in the survival processing paradigm 
using neutral, negative, and survival-related pictures. A survival processing advantage was found 
for survival-related pictures in adults, for negative pictures in 11/12-year-olds, and for neutral 
pictures in 7/8-year-olds. In Experiment 3, 11/12-year-olds and adults had to imagine the 
standard survival scenario or an adapted survival condition (or pleasantness condition) that was 
designed to reduce the possibilities for elaborative processing. We found superior memory 
retention for both survival scenarios in children and adults. Collectively, our results evidently 
show that the survival processing advantage is developmentally invariant and that certain 
proximate mechanisms (elaboration and distinctiveness) underlie these developmental trends.  
  
Keywords: Adaptive memory, proximate mechanisms, false memory, memory, development 
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Developmental Trends in Adaptive Memory 
 
The argument that our memory systems are shaped because of selection pressures present 
in the ancestral past and associated with survival and reproductive success is not new and is 
advocated by many memory scholars (e.g., Anderson, 1989; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 
2002). This view implies that remnants of these selection pressures may have left notable 
imprints in the operating characteristics of memory and that as a result, memory is especially 
engineered to encode, store, and retrieve information relevant for survival. Interestingly, such a 
view about memory can easily be placed into an empirical program that does not fall prey to the 
“just-so” and “Panglossian” critiques often enshrined within the tenets of evolutionary 
psychology (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). Indeed, this interpretation about the genesis of memory 
is ripe for a priori predictions regarding the evolutionary constraints of memory.  
A paradigm that has engendered specific predictions about adaptive memory is the 
survival-processing paradigm. Indeed, recent interest in the evolution of memory has been 
fuelled primarily as the result of findings from this paradigm, ones that show that memory 
performance is superior when processing has focused on the fitness-relevance of the to-be-
remembered information. For example, in the first study of this sort, Nairne, Pandeirada, and 
Thompson (2007) had participants take part in an incidental memory paradigm in which they 
were instructed to imagine different ancestrally-relevant situations and rate a set of unrelated 
words for their relevance to survival in this situation. Specifically, some participants had to 
imagine being stranded on the grasslands of a foreign land without any food and drinks and in 
potential threat of predators. Other participants had to imagine that they had to move to a foreign 
land or had to indicate how pleasant they experienced the words. After the imagination 
instruction and a short filler task, participants received a surprise memory task. Nairne and 
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colleagues showed that memory retention was highest for the group that had to process survival-
related information. This effect has also been dubbed the survival processing advantage.  
Since the advent of this study, numerous replication studies on the survival processing 
advantage have been conducted. Basically, it has been shown that the survival processing 
advantage is a robust phenomenon under a wide variety of conditions. To review some studies, 
the survival processing advantage persisted even when control conditions were matched on 
arousal, novelty, and media exposure (Kang, McDermott, & Cohen, 2008), schematic processing 
(Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 2008), when control conditions were used that are known to 
boost memory retention (Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008), and when visual stimuli (i.e., 
pictures) were used (Otgaar, Smeets, & van Bergen, 2010). Furthermore, the effect remained 
intact in recall and recognition tests and for between- and within-subjects designs (e.g., Nairne et 
al., 2007). Importantly, while most of these studies have used the incidental survival memory 
paradigm to analyze the evolutionary foundations of memory, studies have also shown that 
memory performance is sensitive for survival-relevant information in intentional memory tasks 
(Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, Raymaekers, & van Beers, in press). 
Collectively, studies have confirmed that memory prefers the processing of information related 
to survival value (for a review see Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010).  Furthermore, it has been shown 
that not only survival processing results in mnemonic advantages, also survival information leads 
to similar benefits (Howe & Derbish, 2010) 
Besides the abundance of successful replications, studies have also revealed certain 
boundary conditions of the survival processing advantage. For example, Savine, Scullin, and 
Roediger (2011) demonstrated that when faces were employed as target stimuli, the survival 
processing effect vanished. Seamon and colleagues (2012) examined whether the survival recall 
effect could be generalized to story memory, yet failed to obtain any evidence for it. Otgaar and 
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Smeets (2010) showed that survival processing also increases false memory rates and that when 
net accuracy scores (true/true + false) are computed, accuracy is actually lower in survival-
processing conditions than in other relevant control conditions (see also Howe & Derbish, 2010; 
Otgaar et al., in press). Furthermore, it seems that the survival processing advantage is only 
limited to explicit memory tests and does not emerge in implicit memory tests (Tse & Altaribba, 
2010).  
There are also studies that have included several control conditions that made the survival 
processing advantage disappear. Soderstrom and McCabe (2011) compared the survival group 
with a group that had to imagine being attacked by zombies and found that no survival recall 
effect emerged. Howe and Derbish (in press) varied ancestral relevance (survival in the 
grasslands versus survival on an alien planet) and found that survival-processing effects were 
identical regardless (i.e., no recall advantage) of the ancestral nature of the processing task. 
Finally, Klein, Robertson, and Dalton (2011) reasoned that a critical element of survival is to 
successfully plan the future. They compared the original survival instruction with an instruction 
in which participants had to plan a camping trip. Intriguingly, their results showed that no 
survival processing advantage was present and that even the planning group outperformed the 
survival group in terms of memory performance.  
Some of the just-mentioned findings could be captured under the guise of “ultimate” 
explanations of adaptive memory (e.g., Nairne et al., 2008). That is, these studies have focused 
on the evolutionary function of memory suggesting that reproductive success enhances when 
humans are better able to recollect survival-related information. However, to completely 
comprehend the survival processing advantage, one should also examine the exact underpinnings 
– the proximate mechanisms – of this adaptive memory effect (Scott-Phillips, Dickens, & West, 
2011).  Specifically, ultimate explanations refer to why a certain trait or behavior developed and 
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which fitness consequences such a trait or behavior entails. Regarding the survival processing 
advantage, Nairne et al. (2007) were the first explicating the ultimate role of memory by asking 
why memory should show a preference to survival-relevant information.  So, the ultimate 
explanation concerning the evolution of memory is that it is provides priority to fitness-relevant 
information. Proximate explanations are involved in how a certain trait or behavior evolved and 
which mechanisms underlie that trait or behavior. Thus, proximate explanations build on 
processes that have emerged to achieve the evolutionary purpose of memory (Howe & Otgaar, 
2013).  
In the first paper on adaptive memory, Nairne and colleagues (2007) argued that it is 
unlikely that the survival processing advantage maps on a specific cognitive “survival” 
adaptation or survival module specialized to process fitness-relevant information. Instead, they 
reasoned that different sets of mechanisms have been developed that process for example food 
and predators and that these mechanisms in concert underlie the survival processing advantage. 
However, we argue that the survival processing advantage is more likely to be the result of 
mechanisms unrelated to the concept of survival, but which have an effect on memory 
performance. Interestingly, recent studies shed light on possible proximate mechanisms 
underlying the survival processing advantage.  
For example, Burns, Burns, and Hwang (2011) argued that memory preferentially retains 
information critical for survival because the standard survival instruction loads on both item-
specific and relational processing that jointly maximize memory performance (also see Howe & 
Derbish, in press). Indeed, in the Burns et al. study, they showed that when the survival 
instruction was compared to conditions that increase both types of processing, no survival recall 
effect was found. In a related study, Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) argued that the richness and 
distinctiveness of the survival scenario causes participants to create more elaborate memory 
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traces and thereby also more retrieval opportunities (see also Howe & Derbish, in press). In their 
study, they contrasted the original survival instruction with an instruction in which there was a 
decreased probability to engage in elaborative processing (i.e., participants received a survival 
instruction but it focused only on one problem (finding water) instead of more problems). They 
showed in two experiments using both a between- and within-subjects design that with this 
method, the original survival group did not yield superior memory retention.  
Of particular relevance for the adaptive memory field is the question of whether memory 
is also tuned for survival-relevant information early in ontogeny. The first study that addressed 
this issue showed that 8- and 12-year-olds also displayed a memory benefit for information 
processed for survival relevance (Otgaar & Smeets, 2010). This effect has also been 
demonstrated in 4- and 10-year-old children (Aslan & Bauml, 2012). Moreover, 12-year-old 
children also showed a survival memory benefit in intentional memory tasks (Otgaar et al., in 
press). These studies suggest that even early in development, memory is especially sensitive for 
processing and retaining fitness-relevant information.  
The ontological question about the onset of fitness-related mnemonic advantages is 
relevant because one might argue that for memory to be truly adaptive, its operating evolutionary 
characteristics should also be notable in children. Indeed, many behaviors that are considered to 
be adaptive are present early in life. Think for example about the finding that newborns imitate 
facial gestures (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1985), a finding that has been regarded by some as an 
adaptation (e.g., Bjorklund, 1987). However, there are also many adaptations such as bipedal 
locomotion (approximately one year after birth), antipredator behavior (Barrett, 1999; during the 
first year of life), language (during the second year of life), and secondary sex characteristics 
(during puberty) that are not present in very young children. What this suggests is that the timing 
of an adaptation is not a strict criterion to call a behavior or characteristic adaptive (Buss, 
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Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; Confer et al., 2010; Howe & Otgaar, 2013). 
However, such studies are critical to determine the proximate mechanisms involved in the 
development of adaptive memory (Howe & Otgaar, 2013). 
In the present article, we report on three experiments that examined developmental trends 
in adaptive memory using different paradigms. As mentioned earlier, studies have revealed that 
the adaptive memory effect is present in child samples (Aslan & Bauml, 2012; Otgaar & Smeets, 
2010; Otgaar et al., in press). In our view, the early emergence of this effect in childhood is not 
so much an indication of the development of a particular adaptive behavior, but rather a 
demonstration of the ontogeny of well-known general memory processes.  Indeed, memory 
mechanisms such as distinctiveness effects (e.g., features that distinguish between stimuli) are 
important in memory from infancy (Rovee-Collier & Cuevas, 2009) onward (Howe, 2006, 
2011b).  Item (e.g., stimulus-specific features), relational (e.g., common features among stimuli), 
and gist processing (e.g., processing the semantics of information; Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 
2008) also emerge early in memory and have developmentally invariant characteristics across 
childhood (Howe, 2006, 2011b).   
The principal purpose of this study is to examine whether adaptive mnemonic advantages 
are developmentally invariant for different stimuli and paradigms and whether certain general 
memory mechanisms can perhaps partially account for the oft-observed mnemonic advantages 
for fitness-relevant processing and stimuli. Therefore, in the present manuscript, we report three 
experiments in which both children and adults were tested in each experiment and in which free 
recall performance was measured. Furthermore, to bolster the idea that adaptive memory benefits 
are developmentally invariant, we made use of intentional (Experiment 1) and incidental 
paradigms (Experiments 2 and 3), used different word (Experiments 1 and 3) and picture 
(Experiment 2) stimuli, and included different types of material (unrelated [Experiment 3], 
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survival-, negative-, and neutral-related words [Experiments 1 and 2; see also Table 1]). 
Furthermore, to test whether different general memory mechanisms underlie survival processing, 
each experiment focused on different specific memory mechanisms (see below). Our idea is that 
this combined approach is likely to reveal which proximate mechanisms play a role in the 
survival processing effect and whether this effect is truly developmentally invariant. 
To be more specific, in Experiment 1, we examined 11-year-olds’ and adult participants’ 
memory performance when they were presented with neutral, negative, and survival-related 
wordlists that foster memory illusions (Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) wordlists; Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). These wordlists consist of associatively related words that 
are linked to a non-presented theme word called the critical lure. Studies show that in recall and 
recognition tests, many participants erroneously recollect the critical lure (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, 
& Ceci, 2008). Furthermore, because of the associative nature of these lists, it is highly likely 
that these lists boost relational processing and elaborative processing. If relational processing is 
associated with adaptive memory benefits, then we would expect to find higher recall levels and 
higher memory illusion rates for the survival wordlists than for the other word lists. In this way, 
using these lists is an effective approach to investigate the role of relational processing on the 
survival processing advantage (see Burns et al., 2010 for a similar procedure with categorically-
related wordlists).  
In Experiment 2, 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults were enrolled in a standard 
incidental survival-processing paradigm using neutral, negative, and survival-related pictures. 
Although pictures could enhance the distinctiveness of stimuli, possibly reducing differences 
between survival and control groups, previous work has shown the opposite effect (Otgaar et al., 
2010). Indeed, we predicted that there would be a survival processing advantage and that 
survival pictures would be better recollected than control pictures. Experiment 3 was conducted 
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in order to evaluate a different type of elaboration as a possible proximate mechanism underlying 
the survival processing effect (Howe & Derbish, in press; Kroneisen & Erdfelder, 2011) as well 
as to examine developmental trends associated with this mechanism. That is, in this experiment, 
participants received the standard survival instruction or a modified survival instruction (or a 
pleasantness condition). In the modified survival instruction, participants were granted fewer 
opportunities to engage in elaborative processing because only one survival problem was present 
in this instruction. If elaboration plays a vital role in the survival recall effect, then the survival 
recall effect should be diminished in this new survival condition.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 70 participants were tested in this experiment.  The 11-year-olds (M = 11.4 
years, SD = 4 months) were 35 (17 male, 18 female) predominantly White, middle class children 
whose parents/guardians gave written informed consent and the child’s assent was obtained on 
the day of testing.  The adults (M = 18.6 years, SD = 7 months) were 35 (18 male, 17 female) 
university students who gave informed, written consent on the day of testing. The ethical board 
for the university gave approval for this study. 
Design, Materials, and Procedure 
 The experiment was a 3(List type: neutral, negative, survival) x 2(Age: 11-year-olds, 18-
year-olds) repeated measures design where age was manipulated between- and list type within-
participants.  Fifteen 10-item lists were selected from the word association norms of Nelson, 
McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998): five lists consisting of high associates of neutral critical lures 
(mountain, school, fruit, bread, money), five lists consisting of high associates of negative 
critical lures (sad, bad, fat, cry, anger), and five lists consisting of high associates of survival 
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critical lures (death, hurt, sick, war, fight) (for additional information about how these lists were 
constructed and how they were rated for their survival relevance, see Howe & Derbish, 2010).  
The words with the greatest backward associative strength (BAS) to the critical lures were 
included in each list.  All three list types were equated on BAS, semantic density, word 
frequency, word familiarity, meaningfulness, number of attributes, and imageability.  The 
negative and survival lists were also equated on valence and arousal (see Howe & Derbish, 
2010).  
We included survival-related lists because not only does survival processing itself 
produce memory advantages but so too do survival-relevant materials (Howe & Derbish, 2010). 
Therefore, children and adults were involved in an intentional memory task involving survival-
relevant lists. That is, based on an adaptive memory account, one would expect that survival-
related concepts (e.g., injury, death, virus, war) should be remembered differently than concepts 
that are not directly linked to survival. Moreover, as survival-related words are more likely to be 
emotionally laden, we also included non-survival-related words that were also emotionally laden 
(negative words). We added these words to prevent any effects of arousal or valence that might 
be related to the survival-related words.  
 Upon arrival, participants were given standard memory instructions.  Lists were then 
presented orally in descending order of associative strength, one word at a time, with two 
seconds between each word.  Four lists of each type were randomly selected for presentation to 
each participant (counterbalanced across participants within each age group).  For each 
participant, lists were presented in blocks (4 neutral, 4 negative, 4 survival) with the order of 
blocks also counterbalanced across participants within each age group.  After each list was 
presented, participants were given a 30-sec distractor task (circling random letter pairs in 
randomized alphabet strings) to eliminate short-term memory and serial position effects.  
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Participants were then asked to orally recall as many words as they could from the previous list.  
This study-distractor-test procedure was repeated until all 12 lists had been presented and 
recalled. 
Results and Discussion 
 Because there were no effects due to blocking or gender, and because there were no 
theoretical predictions concerning these variables, they were removed from subsequent analyses.  
The proportion of targets correctly recalled and the number of critical items falsely recalled were 
calculated and analyzed in separate 3(List type: neutral, negative, survival) x 2(Age: 11-year-
olds, 18-year-olds) analyses of variance (ANOVAs).  For true recall, there was a significant main 
effect of age, F(1, 68) = 83.11, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .68, where 11-year-olds (M = .56) recalled fewer 
items than adults (M = .72).  There was also a main effect for list type, F(2, 136) = 22.78, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .21, where post-hoc (Tukey’s HSD) tests showed that survival items (M = .67) were 
recalled better than neutral (M = .49, p < .001) and negative (M = .41, p < .001) items, and these 
latter list types did not differ reliably.  There was no Age x List type interaction. 
 For false recall, there was a main effect for age, F(1, 68) = 24.89, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .36, 
where 11-year-olds (M = .31) falsely recalled fewer critical items than adults (M = .46).  There 
was also a main effect for list type, F(2, 136) = 10.45, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .10, where post-hoc 
(Tukey’s HSD) tests showed that false recall rates were higher for survival items (M = .35) than 
for neutral (M = .24, p < .01) and negative (M = .20, p < .01) items, and these latter list types did 
not differ reliably.  There was no Age x List type interaction. 
 Overall, these results show that items related to survival are better remembered than 
either negative or neutral material.  Moreover, like previous research that has focused on the 
effects of survival material (as opposed to survival processing) on memory performance (Howe 
& Derbish, 2010; Experiment 3), false memories were also more frequent for survival lists than 
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neutral or negative lists.  Importantly, the present research extends these effects to child 
participants and provides strong evidence for developmental invariance.  That is, regardless of 
age, true and false recall rates were higher for survival-related material than neutral or negative 
materials. Together, these results show that with an intentional memory paradigm, memory 
prefers the retention of survival material and development of memory illusions for survival-
related material. Our results imply that relational processing is predominant for survival-related 
material resulting in an increased propensity for memory illusions. In other words, it is likely that 
survival-related information consists of a highly dense and interrelated network with nodes that 
are strongly connected to each other. When activation spreads through such a network, memory 
retention becomes enhanced and false memory illusions become fuelled (see also Toglia, 
Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999). 
 In Experiment 2, we adopted the standard incidental survival-processing paradigm in 
which participants had to imagine a survival or moving scenario or had to rate stimuli for 
pleasantness.  Also, in this experiment, we presented 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults 
with pictures instead of words. We included a younger age group (7/8-year-olds) to examine 
whether survival processing would also appear at younger ages and test whether we could 
replicate earlier work on survival processing advantages in younger children (Aslan & Bauml, 
2012; Otgaar & Smeets. 2010). To build on the work of Experiment 1, participants received 
neutral (e.g., clouds), negative (e.g., pistol), and survival-related (e.g., spider) pictures. We 
expected to find a survival processing advantage and show that survival-related pictures were 
better recollected than the other pictures.  
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Experiment 2 
Participants 
We tested 135 participants with 34 7/8-year-olds (mean age = 7.59, SD = 0.50, 15 girls), 
39 11/12-year-olds (mean age = 11.59, SD = 0.50, 16 girls), and 62 undergraduate students 
(mean age = 20.73, SD = 1.85, 46 women). Children were recruited from elementary schools 
from the south of the Netherlands and students were undergraduates from the Faculty of 
Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. Children received a small present and 
adults were awarded a financial reimbursement (7.50 euro) or course credits for their 
participation.  
Design, Materials, and Procedure 
We used a 3(Age: 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults) x 3(Condition: survival, 
moving, and pleasantness) x 3(Stimulus type: neutral, negative, and survival) split-plot design 
with the latter factor being a within-subjects variable. Participants were involved in the original 
survival-processing paradigm (Nairne et al., 2007). Participants were randomly assigned to the 
different scenarios (survival: n = 46, moving: n = 44, pleasantness: n = 45). Participants received 
a Dutch translation of one of these instructions: 
Survival “In this task, we would like you to imagine that you are stranded in the 
grasslands of a foreign land, without any basic materials. Over the next few months, you’ll need 
to find steady supplies of food and water and protect yourself from predators. We are going to 
show you some pictures, and we would like you to rate how relevant each picture would be in 
this survival condition. Some of the pictures may be relevant and others not-it’s up to you to 
decide.” 
Moving “In this task, we would like you to imagine that you are planning to move to a 
new home in a foreign land. Over the next few months, you’ll need to locate and purchase a new 
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home and transport your belongings. We are going to show you some pictures, and we would 
like you to rate how relevant each picture would be in this moving condition. Some of the 
pictures may be relevant and others not-it’s up to you to decide.” 
Pleasantness “In this task, we are going to show you some pictures, and we would like 
you to rate the pleasantness of each picture. Some of the pictures may be pleasant and others may 
not-it’s up to you to decide.” 
After the instructions, the participants had to rate 30 pictures (for each stimulus type 10 
pictures) for survival or moving relevance (1 = not relevant, 5 = extremely relevant), or 
pleasantness (1 = not pleasant, 5 = very pleasant). Pictures were selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1995). The negative (e.g., theft, 
explosion) and survival (e.g., spider, drowning) pictures were more emotionally negative (M = 
3.20, SD = 0.73) and more arousing (M = 5.60, SD = 0.93) than the neutral (e.g., flower, plate) 
pictures (valence: M = 5.64, SD = 0.94; arousal: M = 2.66, SD = 0.69; both ps < .001). The 
pictures were unrelated to each other and also bore no relationship with set of words used in the 
first experiment. Two practice pictures were presented before the start of the experiment. Each 
picture was shown for 8 s. on a computer screen. To ensure that children understood the concept 
of survival in relation with the pictures, a pilot study was conducted with 13 children who were 
not involved in this experiment (mean age = 9.46, SD = 1.94) in which they received the 30 
pictures and had to rate on a 7-point smiley scale (1 = not survival-relevant, 7 = extremely 
survival-relevant) how survival-relevant each picture was. Furthermore, to each child, the 
concept of survival was explained using the instruction of Nairne and colleagues (2007). Our 
results showed that the survival pictures received significantly higher survival ratings (M = 5.91, 
SD = 0.64) than the negative (M = 4.56, SD = 0.63) and neutral pictures (M = 1.71, SD = 0.87; 
F(2,24) = 65.28, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 0.92). 
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After the rating task, participants were presented with a 2-min distractor task (Tetris). 
Following this, they were asked to recall all the pictures they could remember. This recall task 
lasted for 10 min.  
Results and Discussion 
Because no effect of gender on rating and proportion recall was detected, gender was 
excluded from subsequent analyses. Turning to the rating data, a 3(Age: 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-
year-olds, and adults) x 3(Condition: survival, moving, and pleasantness) x 3(Stimulus type: 
neutral, negative, and survival) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. We found a 
significant Age x Condition x Stimulus type interaction (F(8,252) = 2.20, p < .05, ηp
2
 = 0.07). 
Performing simple effects analyses, our results showed that for the survival pictures, younger 
and older children in the survival (7/8-year-olds: M = 3.94; 11/12-year-olds: M = 3.25) and 
moving (7/8-year-olds: M = 3.56; 11/12-year-olds: M = 3.72) group gave significantly higher 
ratings than children in the pleasantness group (7/8-year-olds: M = 1.68; 11/12-year-olds: M = 
1.78; ps < .05). No significant differences emerged for the adults. A similar pattern was evident 
for the negative pictures: Higher ratings were provided by children in the survival (7/8-year-olds: 
M = 3.80; 11/12-year-olds: M = 3.23) and moving (7/8-year-olds: M = 3.59; 11/12-year-olds: M 
= 3.52) group relative to children in the pleasantness group (7/8-year-olds: M = 1.73; 11/12-year-
olds: M = 1.68; ps < .05). Again, no difference was present for the adult ratings. For the neutral 
pictures, we found that all participants gave significantly higher ratings (F(4,126) = 10.72, p < 
.001; ηp
2
 = 0.15) in the pleasantness condition (M = 3.25) than in the survival (M = 2.73) and 
moving (M = 2.52) conditions.  
When we performed a similar analysis on the recall data, the following findings emerged. 
Our analyses revealed a significant Age x Condition x Stimulus type interaction (F(8,252) = 
2.20, p < .05, ηp
2
 = 0.07; Figure 1). Simple effect analyses showed that as expected, a survival 
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recall advantage was found. Interestingly, however, this effect was more pronounced for survival 
pictures that were rated by adults. Specifically, adult participants in the survival condition (M = 
.63) remembered significantly more survival-related pictures than adults in the moving (M = .51) 
and pleasantness condition (M = .53, p < .05). This pattern was not present for child samples. 
What we did find was that for the negative pictures, a survival recall effect was evident for the 
11/12-year-olds in that they recollected more information in the survival condition (M = .41) 
than in the moving (M = .32) and pleasantness (M = .29, p < .05) condition. Also, for the 
youngest age group, evidence was also present for a survival processing advantage for the 
neutral pictures. Here, 7/8-year old children in the survival condition (M = .33) remembered 
significantly more neutral pictures than children in the moving (M = .25) and pleasantness (M = 
.23) conditions. All other effects were not significant.   
For pure exploratory reasons and to examine congruity effects, we also included the 
ratings (ratings for the different types of pictures) as covariates in our model and examined 
whether our findings would differ. However, the covariates did not have a significant effect on 
the recall measures (all ps > .05) 
To summarize, we found a survival processing advantage in all age groups but it differed 
as a function of stimulus type. That is, for the adults, a survival processing advantage was 
detected for the survival pictures. For the 11/12-year-olds, a survival processing advantage was 
found for the negative pictures, while for the 7/8-year old children, neutral pictures displayed a 
survival processing advantage.  
We also examined whether participants recollected incorrect pictures as a function of 
Condition. A univariate ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of Condition. Post-hoc 
Tukey HSD tests showed that participants in the survival condition (M = 0.35) made 
significantly more errors than participants in the pleasantness condition (M = 0.11; p < .05). 
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Although the moving group (M = 0.27) had lower error rates than the survival group, this 
difference was not significant.  
This experiment replicates and extends previous adaptive memory work using pictures 
(Otgaar et al., 2010). That is, like Otgaar and colleagues (2010), we also found that adults 
displayed a survival recall advantage when pictures were employed as stimuli. However, the 
current experiment adds that this was only the case for the survival-related pictures. For the other 
types of pictures (negative and neutral), no mnemonic benefit emerged when pictures were rated 
for survival-relevance. What this result shows is that it is not only survival processing itself that 
fuels memorability but also the type of material. Together, survival processing and survival-
related material (i.e., pictures) seem to propel mnemonic advantages. This has also been 
corroborated in other studies (e.g., Howe & Derbish, 2010) and is in line with Experiment 1 that 
showed that predominantly survival material gains memory precedence.  Although we did not 
show that children showed similar survival-related memory benefits for survival-related material, 
we did find some evidence that for negative pictures, the older children displayed a survival 
processing advantage and that for the neutral pictures, a survival processing advantage was 
present for the younger children. Collectively, the results of this experiment show that for the 
younger and older children and adults, tentative evidence exists that they preferentially process 
pictures according to survival-relevance.  
Interestingly, Experiment 2 also showed that more erroneous pictures were recollected 
when participants were in the survival condition relative to the pleasantness condition. This fits 
nicely with the data from Otgaar et al. (2010) that yielded similar results. As mentioned in 
Experiment 1, it is likely that this effect is due to the survival instruction leading to increased 
relational processing, thereby increasing error rates. Indeed, we know from previous studies that 
survival processing likely leads to increased false memory rates probably because of more 
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reliance on gist traces or associative activation (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010; 
Otgaar et al., in press; Smeets, Otgaar, Raymaekers, Peters, & Merckelbach, 2012). However, it 
must also be noted that the increase in error rates for the survival condition did not reliably differ 
from the moving condition.  
One issue that remains vital is what proximate mechanism underpins this survival 
processing advantage. In Experiment 1, we showed that the relational nature of survival material 
is likely to accrue superior memory performance. Other proximate mechanisms have also been 
receiving attention. Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011, p.1554) for example argued that “the degree 
to which survival processing invites elaborative, distinctive forms of encoding would predict the 
mnemonic benefit of survival processing.” So, according to this interpretation, the grasslands 
scenario results in participants thinking more easily of a number of related features than other 
scenarios. These features would in turn create many retrieval cues that together boost recall.   
To examine this issue, Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) included an extra survival 
scenario in which the number of survival problems was significantly reduced. That is, in the 
original survival scenario, participants have to imagine being faced with a number of problems 
(i.e., no food, no water, in danger of predator) that increases the likelihood for elaborative 
processing. The new survival scenario that they used included only one problem (i.e., no water). 
When this new scenario was pitted against the moving group, the survival recall advantage 
vanished thereby suggesting that this new scenario reduced the opportunities to engage in 
elaborative processing. The purpose of Experiment 3 was to test whether children would 
similarly show a disappearance of the survival processing advantage when they are confronted 
with fewer possibilities for elaborative processing. Because distinctiveness effects appear early 
in development, one could predict to find similar effects in children.  
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Experiment 3 
Participants 
Sixty-one 11/12-year-olds (mean age = 11.62, SD = 0.49; 33 boys) and 60 undergraduate 
students (mean age = 22.50, SD = 4.68; 13 men) were included in this experiment.  Children 
were recruited from primary schools from the south of the Netherlands and students were 
undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
Children received a small award and adults were given a financial compensation (7.50 euro) or 
course credits for their participation.  
Design, Materials, and Procedure 
We used a 2(Age: 11/12-year-olds vs. adults) x Condition (survival, survival-short, 
pleasantness) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly allocated to the different 
conditions (survival: n = 40; survival-short: n = 40; pleasantness: n = 41). Participants in the 
standard survival and pleasantness condition received the same instructions as in Experiment 2 
(except that they were told that they were presented with words instead of pictures). Participants 
in the survival-short condition received a Dutch translation of the instruction used by Kroneisen 
and Erdfelder (2011).  
Survival-short “In this task, we would like you to imagine that you are stranded in the 
grasslands of a foreign land. After searching along the surrounding area and the debris flushed to 
the shore, you are bound to realize that you have a major problem of survival: you have no 
potable waters. We are going to show you a list of words, and we would like you to rate how 
relevant each word would be in this survival condition. Some of the words may be relevant and 
others not-it’s up to you to decide.” 
After receiving the instructions, participants received 30 neutral, unrelated words that had 
to be rated according to each scenario.  These words were the same words as used in Nairne and 
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colleagues first study (2007), but translated into Dutch (e.g., mountain, pepper, book). The words 
were also not related to the pictures and words used in the first two experiments. Words were 
presented on a computer screen for 5 s. each. Two practice items were included to familiarize the 
participant with the task. Ratings were made on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not relevant, 5 = 
extremely relevant; 1 = not pleasant, 5 = very pleasant). Following the rating task, a short filler 
task was included (Tetris) that lasted for 2 min. Finally, a recall phase lasting 10 min. was 
presented.  
Results and Discussion 
Because gender did not affect rating and recall performance, it was excluded from further 
analyses. With respect to the rating data, we found a significant main effect of Condition 
(F(2,117) = 29.52, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 0.34). Specifically, post-hoc Tukey HSD tests showed that the 
pleasantness group (M = 3.26) gave significantly higher ratings than the survival (M = 2.74) and 
survival-short (M = 2.46, p <  .05) groups. Furthermore, the survival group had significantly 
higher ratings than the new survival group (p < .05). All other effects were not significant.  
Regarding our recall data, results demonstrated a significant main effect of Condition 
(F(2,117) = 6.01, p < .01, ηp
2
 = 0.09). Remarkably, Tukey HSD tests showed the following: 
Both the original survival (M = .36) and survival-short group (M = .36) had significantly higher 
true memory rates than the pleasantness group (M = .29; p < .05).  As can be seen, the two 
survival scenario groups did not differ significantly from each other. Furthermore, a significant 
Age effect was detected (F(1,117) = 35.89, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 0.24) with adults (M =  .40) 
remembering more words than children (M = . 28). The Age x Condition interaction effect was 
not significant.  
Like Experiment 2, we also explored whether the recall data were affected by the ratings 
of the participants. Therefore, we ran the analyses again including the ratings as covariate. 
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Although the effect of ratings on recall was significant (p < .001), the pattern of findings did not 
change thereby excluding the possibility that ratings affected our recall data.  
We also looked at the effect of survival processing on the reporting of incorrect words. 
Although both the original grasslands condition (M =  .55) and the survival-short condition (M = 
.53) had higher error rates than the pleasantness condition (M = .27), this difference was not 
significant (p = .13). We also found a significant main effect of Age (F(1,117) = 7.20, p < .01, 
ηp
2
 = 0.06) with adults (M = .62) being more susceptible to the creation of memory errors than 
children (M = .28).  
In sum, the results of this experiment nicely reveal that both survival contexts (i.e., 
original and new condition) result in superior memory performance thereby underscoring the 
robustness of survival processing effects on memory. However, it seems that this result is at odds 
with the findings of Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) who found that the adapted survival 
condition resulted in lower memorability than the original grasslands condition (see Experiment 
1) and did not differ from a control moving condition. According to Kroneisen and Erdfelder 
(2011), the explanation of this effect was due to the new survival context causing less elaborative 
processing, thereby reducing the chance for superior recall.  
Two issues are imperative with respect to this discrepancy in findings. First, one might 
argue that we used another control condition (i.e., pleasantness) compared to the one (i.e., 
moving) used by Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) and that this inconsistency was the basis of the 
divergent findings. However, previous studies have not found the moving and pleasantness 
condition to differ from each other in terms of overall memory performance (e.g., Nairne et al., 
2007). So, it is unlikely that a different control condition is related to differences between our 
study and that by Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011). Second, although Kroneisen and Erdfelder 
(2011) argue that their new shortened scenario results in less elaborative processing and thereby 
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leads to fewer recall possibilities than the original survival condition, in their second experiment 
they do not find any significant memory differences between the original and adapted survival 
contexts. This is perfectly in line with our results. This suggests that it is probable that the 
adapted survival scenario may not be the best method to study elaborative processing and that in 
our study, the effect of survival processing on memory was stable in both survival scenarios.  
Still, some differences do remain between our study and that of Kroneisen and Erdfelder 
(2011) that might have led to divergent results between the two studies. First of all, we used a 2-
min distractor period as has been done in Nairne et al. (2007) while Kroneisen and Erdfelder 
used a longer period (10 min.). Although it is unclear what precise effect this could have exerted, 
it is known that the survival processing advantage can vary when small changes are inserted 
(Kroneisen & Erdfelder, 2011). Second, in our third experiment, we found lower recall 
performance for the original survival group than what has been found in Nairne et al. (2007) and 
Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011). This could be due to the fact that our sample size was smaller 
than that of Kroneisen and Erdfelder, something that may have resulted in less power weakening 
the likelihood of finding statistically reliable effects. Future studies should therefore examine 
whether these differences might indeed be related to the inconsistency in findings.  
General Discussion 
The purpose of the current series of experiments was to examine developmental trends in 
adaptive memory and determine whether survival-processing effects were developmentally 
invariant using a variety of stimuli and paradigms. The results of these experiments provide 
compelling evidence that the survival processing advantage is developmentally invariant. From 
an evolutionary standpoint, our results support the idea that it is likely that selection pressures 
from our ancestral past left “ footprints” in our memory system.  These footprints have less to do 
with a predisposition to favor the processing of survival-relevant information and more to do 
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with the greater likelihood of engaging various proximate mechanisms (e.g., elaboration, 
distinctiveness) in these tasks. Moreover, our experiments show that this adaptive memory 
predisposition is present in children and adults.  
In Experiment 1, we used an intentional memory paradigm to tackle the issue of 
developmental trends in the processing of survival-relevant materials. Testing 11-year-olds and 
adult participants, we found that when neutral, negative, and survival DRM word lists were 
presented memory was superior for the survival-related words. This finding demonstrates that 
survival-related materials also enjoy a mnemonic benefit but also that, because of the relational 
nature of the DRM word lists, false memories were more easily elicited for the survival word 
lists relative to other word lists. This lower net accuracy for survival information extends earlier 
work on survival processing and false memories (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & Smeets, 
2010; Otgaar et al., in press) by demonstrating that these false memory effects also occur in child 
samples and especially for survival material. Furthermore, Experiment 1 showed that the survival 
mnemonic benefits are probably caused by increased relational processing and elaborative 
processing since the survival word lists were more associatively rich than the other lists.  
Experiment 2 used the typical survival-processing paradigm including neutral, negative, 
and survival-related pictures and 7/8-, 11/12-year-olds, and adults. Like the first experiment and 
in accordance with previous work (Otgaar et al., 2010), we found partial evidence for the 
survival processing effect in all age groups. Interestingly, we found that this effect was mainly 
present for the survival-related pictures. However, this only occurred for the adult participants. 
For the 7/8-year-olds, neutral pictures enjoyed a survival memory preference and for the 11/12-
year-olds, a survival processing advantage was just present for the negative pictures. So, 
although we replicated earlier results on the survival-processing paradigm using pictures, this 
experiment adds that all types of pictures are likely to exhibit the usual survival processing 
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advantage, but that it likely depends on the age which type of picture enjoys a survival memory 
benefit. Although it is not completely evident why in this experiment the survival processing 
effect was dependent on the type of material for different age groups, one possible solution could 
be that we used an intentional memory approach in Experiment 1 while we used an incidental 
one in Experiment 2. It is possible that survival-related material is better remembered for all age 
groups when an explicit instruction is provided to remember those pictures than when no explicit 
instruction is provided. The result could then be that more attention and resources are allocated 
to survival-related material relative to other material resulting in better memory for survival-
related material. 
The finding that pictures also demonstrate a survival processing advantage might be seen 
as surprising as research shows that pictures are more distinctive than for instance words that 
might result in increased memorability for all conditions (and not specific for the survival 
condition; e.g., Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999). On the other hand, it might also be the case that this 
picture superiority effect (Rajaram, 1996) results in larger survival processing effects for pictures 
than words because of increased deep processing of pictures relative to words. Indeed, dual-
coding theories stipulate that pictures activate both verbal and nonverbal (pictorial) coded 
memory thereby leading to superior mnemonic advantages for pictures (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; 
D’Agostino, O’Neill, & Paivio, 1977; Hyde & Jenkins, 1973). Relatedly, studies suggest that 
from an evolutionary stance, humans had to process pictures (images) at an earlier stage (Paivio, 
2007) than words implying that the survival processing advantage should be quite large with 
imagery-based materials. Whereas Experiment 1 provided a nice demonstration of the role of 
relational processing and elaboration as a proximate mechanism in the development of adaptive 
memory effects, Experiment 2 provided a similar demonstration for the role of distinctiveness. 
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In Experiment 3 we extended our understanding of the role of elaboration using a method 
employed by Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011). According to these authors, the survival 
processing effect stems for elaborative processing because the survival scenario grants 
participants a multitude of opportunities to engage in elaboration. By providing participants with 
a scenario in which only one survival problem was present (i.e., no potable water), it is more 
difficult to elaborate with respect to this scenario thereby reducing memorability. When we 
contrasted this new survival scenario with the original scenario (and pleasantness condition), we, 
however, found that for both 11/12-year-olds and adults, these scenarios did not differ in terms 
of memory recollection. What we did find was that both scenarios outperformed the pleasantness 
condition thereby demonstrating the classical survival processing advantage. So, our survival 
processing manipulation was effective in terms of memory performance.  
As mentioned before, even Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) found in one of their 
experiments (Exp. 2) that these two scenarios did not statistically differ from each other in terms 
of memorability. Thus it seems that this new survival scenario might not be the best solution to 
manipulate elaborative processing. More work needs to be done to test the locus of these 
divergent findings, with one promising avenue being to vary the levels of elaborative processing 
across a variety of processing tasks.  Indeed, when this was done with adults, the survival 
processing advantage disappeared and memory performance was determined by the extent of 
elaborative processing regardless of scenario (Howe & Derbish, in press).  
In addition, Howe and Derbish (in press) reasoned, like Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011), 
that the grasslands scenario might require greater elaboration than other scenarios (e.g., moving, 
going on holiday) simply because they are relatively unfamiliar and would have to draw on 
things participants might have read or seen on television.  Indeed, such ancestral scenarios would 
not have been experienced by modern humans so considerable imagination would have to be 
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used to rate items for survival as requested by the experimenter.  When equally unfamiliar but 
non-ancestral scenarios (stranded on a foreign planet, stranded under the sea) whose elaboration 
requirements were rated as similar to that of the usual survival-processing tasks were used, the 
survival processing advantage vanished. Thus, it is highly likely that the usual survival-
processing scenarios spontaneously engage participants to use more elaboration and imagination 
than when more familiar scenarios are employed.  
Equally important in this debate is that even non-ancestral and unusual scenarios also led 
the survival processing advantage disappear. That is, Soderstrom and McCabe (2011) compared 
the standard survival scenario with a scenario in which participants had to imagine being 
attacked by zombies. Obviously, this zombie scenario is quite unusual and not ancestrally 
relevant. Like Howe and Derbish (in press), the survival processing advantage disappeared. So, 
these just-mentioned findings imply that the use of such unusual scenario might be an alternative 
to study elaborative processing in the adaptive memory field.  
Regarding the developmental course of adaptive memory, our argument is that finding a 
survival processing effect early in childhood is not a definite sign to call this effect adaptive. As 
Howe and Otgaar (2013, p. 17) specified “[a]lthough we may all eventually exhibit an advantage 
for storing and retrieving fitness-relevant information, the ontogenetic course of the emergence 
of this adaptive memory effect may vary considerably.”  Therefore, we suggest that well-
documented mechanisms such as elaboration, relational, and item-specific processing are factors 
that underlie the benefits observed when participants engage in survival processing or study 
survival-related materials. Because these processes have been shown to possess developmentally 
invariant characteristics (Howe & Otgaar, 2013), it is more likely that these processes are related 
to fitness advantages in memory. Indeed, our experiments nicely show that this is the case.  
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Another important result of the current experiments is that we found tentative evidence 
for increased error rates in the survival condition and survival material relative to the other 
conditions and other material. Previous work has also shown that survival processing and 
survival material enhances the susceptibility to memory errors (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Nairne 
et al., 2007; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010; Otgaar et al., in press; Smeets et al., 2012). Of course, it is 
likely that proximate mechanisms as relational and elaborative processing are the driving 
catalysts in these effects. Although one might postulate that errors are not in line with an 
evolutionary idea, evidence is accumulating that in certain circumstances, memory errors are 
adaptive. Take for example an experiment by Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, and Ormerod 
(2011) that found that elevated memory errors are positively related with convergent thinking; an 
aspect of creativity. Another example is the finding that memory errors prime solutions of 
complex problem solving tasks (e.g., Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011). Together, 
these findings show that under certain circumstances, memory errors can have positive and 
adaptive consequences (Howe, 2011a; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011).  
This leaves us with the question what our findings say about the evolutionary background 
of memory. It seems clear now that adaptive memory benefits are developmentally invariant. 
Our experiments replicate previous studies (Aslan & Bauml, 2012; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010) and 
add that adaptive memory effects hold for children and adults even when using different stimuli 
and paradigms. One might be tempted to conclude that these findings fit well with the idea that 
humans possess a sort of adaptive memory adaptation to preferentially process survival-relevant 
information (Nairne et al., 2007). As we have outlined earlier, an equally plausible alternative 
possibility is that our experiments imply that certain well-known memory principles as relational 
processing (Experiments 1 and 3) and distinctiveness (Experiment 2) might be present at an early 
stage and that these drive superior memory retention.  
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It is undoubtedly true that our memory evolved out of certain selection pressures, yet one 
may wonder whether a certain simple survival instruction might be the key to unlock certain 
adaptive memory mechanisms. What our and other recent studies (e.g., Klein, in press) show is 
that survival processing itself might not be special after all and that other memory principles 
might underlie the survival memory effect (Howe & Otgaar, 2013; Otgaar, Jelicic, & Smeets, 
2013). Of course, this is not to deny the evolutionary existence of adaptive memory, but we 
believe the examination of these general memory principles in relation to survival processing 
might shed vital light into the foundation of adaptive memory. Such a research avenue would 
broaden our knowledge about the proximate mechanisms behind adaptive memory and tell us 
why memory is significant for our survival.  
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Table 1 
Commonalities and differences between the three experiments 
Note: Neu=Neutral, Neg=Negative, Sur=Survival, Pleas=Pleasantness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment Ages Study Material Conditions Retrieval task 
1 11, Adult Thematic lists Neu; Neg, Sur Recall (intentional) 
2 7/8,11/12, Adult Pictures Neu; Neg; Sur Recall (incidental) 
3 11/12, Adult Unrelated words Sur, Sur-short, Pleas Recall (incidental) 
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Figure 
Figure 1. Proportion correct recall of survival-related, negative, and neutral pictures as a 
function of Condition and Age (error bars represent standard error of means).  
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